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The Changing Face of Central
Banking in the 1990s
Graydon Paulin, International Department
• During the 1990s, with impetus for change
coming from various sources, including an
increased emphasis on price stability,
governments and central banks in the
industrialized countries endeavoured to
improve and adapt the frameworks within
which monetary policy is implemented.
• While targets for the exchange rate or for the
growth rate of money continue to play a role
in some countries, explicit targets for the rate
of inﬂation have become increasingly popular
as the numerical focus for monetary policy.
• Central banks have acquired greater oper-
ational independence to pursue their policy
objectives. They have also become more open
institutions. Increased emphasis on communi-
cation and transparency is seen as important
not only in terms of accountability to the public,
but for increasing the effectiveness of policy
actions and for reducing economic uncertainty.
• Many of the changes implemented by central
banks were influenced by the perceived
importance of improving their credibility, in
turn making it easier for them to achieve their
policy objectives. Although the contribution
of the evolving policy framework is difﬁcult to
pin down, inﬂation and inﬂation expectations
fell dramatically over the decade.
uring the 1990s, central banks made signif-
icant changes to the way they operate. The
impetus for change came from various
sources. The evolution of economic theory
has always had a constant, but sometimes subtle,
inﬂuence on current thinking about monetary policy
and how it should be practised. More compelling
pressure for change has come from economic and
ﬁnancial upheaval, changing political circumstances,
and technological progress. The desire for more infor-
mation from key public institutions has also been a
factor in recent years. Finally, their own experience
and interaction with each other have inﬂuenced how
central banks now operate.1 In the face of these forces,
central banks have shown themselves to be more
adaptable than the staid exteriors they often present to
the public might suggest.
From an institutional perspective, the 1990s will be
remembered primarily for the creation of the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB)—a new, transnational central
bank. The ECB (and its predecessor, the European
Monetary Institute) faced the challenging task of
establishing a policy framework that would operate
effectively across its 11 member states. Other institu-
tions, such as the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan,
and the Swedish Riksbank, also underwent compre-
hensive legislated reforms in the latter half of the
1990s that signiﬁcantly affected the way they func-
tioned. Much earlier, around the beginning of the dec-
ade, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand underwent
reforms that may well have inﬂuenced other banks.
Changes elsewhere were, perhaps, less dramatic but
1.  The adoption of best practices has been facilitated by recent efforts to sur-
vey and publish comprehensive comparisons of central bank activities. The
Bank of England recently published a survey of the policy frameworks of
77 national central banks (Fry et al. 1999). An earlier survey by the Bank for
International Settlements (1997) compared methods of policy implementa-
tion. The International Monetary Fund is preparing a supporting document
for its Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies,
which will examine a wide range of central bank activities.
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still important. Thus, while the thrust of legislation
governing the Bank of Canada’s responsibility for
monetary policy remained relatively unchanged
during the 1990s, the cumulative impact of the broad
range of initiatives undertaken by the Bank has been
substantial.
This article is primarily concerned with changes asso-
ciated with the monetary policy frameworks of central
banks in the industrialized economies. A monetary
policy framework has several elements, including a
readily identiﬁed objective, a strategy for achieving
that objective (which may include numerical targets),
operational mechanisms for implementation, and
institutional structures designed to support the con-
duct of monetary policy. In line with these elements,
the article ﬁrst discusses views on price stability as the
objective of monetary policy and then reviews various
policy strategies, including targeting the exchange
rate, money growth, and inﬂation itself, as a means of
achieving this objective. It then looks at changes in
central banking with respect to the institutional struc-
tures in place for carrying out monetary policy, such
as central bank independence, accountability, and
transparency.
Clarifying Objectives
A clear objective is an important starting point for any
policy framework. For a number of central banks,
however, the legislation by which they were governed
in the post-war period did not always facilitate a clear
understanding of objectives—often describing mul-
tiple, and sometimes inconsistent, policy objectives.
The disappointing experience of the 1970s and 1980s
(when high inﬂation coexisted with high unemploy-
ment), together with the evolution of economic theory,
reinforced the view that there is no long-run trade-off
between inﬂation and unemployment—that is, that
higher rates of inﬂation cannot be used to boost eco-
nomic growth and reduce unemployment in a lasting
fashion. Indeed, this experience lay behind a growing
consensus that price stability is the most appropriate
objective for monetary policy.
Crucially, support for price stability came not only
from central banks, but from governments as well.
Reﬂecting this, the treaty governing the ECB states
that “the primary objective of the ESCB [European
System of Central Banks] shall be to maintain price
stability.”2 In the late 1990s, various governments
2.  Treaty Establishing the European Community, article 105(1), December
1991.
introduced new legislation explicitly identifying price
stability as the objective of central bank policy—the
United Kingdom (effective June 1998), Japan (April
1998), and Sweden (January 1999). Similar legislation
had been passed much earlier (1989) in New Zealand.
In some countries, the message that price stability is
the only appropriate goal for monetary policy has
been reinforced through joint statements by central
banks and governments. Thus, while the preamble to
legislation governing the Bank of Canada refers to a
number of potential objectives, joint statements by the
Bank and the Canadian government—the ﬁrst made
in 1991—focus on the importance of price stability.3
[There is] a growing consensus that
price stability is the most appropriate
objective for monetary policy.
Monetary authorities have stressed that a focus on
price stability does not imply the neglect of economic
growth and employment. Rather, price stability is
regarded as the key contribution that monetary policy
can make to promoting sustainable growth and maxi-
mizing the level of employment. Consider the legisla-
tion governing the U.S. Federal Reserve. Although it
has been modiﬁed on several occasions since the Fed
was established in 1913, the legislation retains the
dual objectives of price stability and full employment.
Nevertheless, numerous public statements by U.S.
monetary ofﬁcials have emphasized the importance of
controlling inﬂation, often referring explicitly to price
stability. In the long run, price stability and full
employment are seen as entirely consistent. Cecchetti
and Ehrmann (1999) present evidence indicating that
the Fed’s level of aversion to inﬂation over the 1990s
was, in fact, similar to that of most other central banks.
Choosing a Strategy
Once a clear objective is established, central banks still
need a strategy for achieving and maintaining an
acceptably low level of inﬂation. While different
3. See Bank of Canada (1991), “Targets for reducing inﬂation,” Bank of Canada
Review, March. Subsequent statements were made in 1993 and 1998. Another
example is Australia—see “Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy,”
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approaches have been tried over the post-war period,
the focus in the past decade has typically been on
strategies that involve targeting the exchange rate, the
rate of money growth, and the rate of inﬂation itself. 4
Exchange rate targeting
Fixing a country’s exchange rate can, in principle, be
used as part of a coherent strategy to achieve low
inﬂationovertime,bytyingdomesticmonetarypolicy
to that of a partner country which itself has low inﬂa-
tion. But since monetary policy decisions are then
effectively ceded to the partner country, this means
that monetary policy will be unresponsive to domestic
economic conditions and indifferent to growth in out-
put and employment.
Although enthusiasm for ﬁxed exchange rates tended
to wane over the course of the post-war period,
exchange rate targeting has continued to feature
prominently in Europe. At the beginning of the 1990s,
nine EU countries were members of the Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM), a ﬁxed exchange rate regime.5 The
creation of the ERM was motivated partly by a desire
for closer ties among European countries. Under-
pinned by the German mark, it also gave participating
countries the opportunity to take advantage of the
strong anti-inﬂation reputation of the Bundesbank.
The United Kingdom joined the ERM in October 1990
(after which U.K. inﬂation fell from over 10 per cent to
under 2 per cent by January 1993). In addition, Fin-
land, Norway, and Sweden all began to target stable
exchange rates against the European currency unit
(ecu) in the early 1990s.6
The limitations of this approach were highlighted
when divergent economic conditions within Europe
(partly as a result of German reuniﬁcation in 1991), as
well as uncertainty about progress towards European
monetary union (EMU), cast doubt on the sustainabil-
ity of the ERM. Under mounting pressure, the United
Kingdom and Italy left the ERM in September 1992,
and the three Nordic countries abandoned their pegs
against the ecu.
Nevertheless, membership in the ERM expanded in
the second half of the 1990s. Italy rejoined in 1996, and
new members were added: Austria, Finland, and
4.  Mishkin (1999) is a useful reference on different policy strategies.
5.  Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Spain, and West Germany. Exchange rates were allowed to move around a
central parity rate within speciﬁed bands, although devaluations of the cen-
tral parity were common occurrences for some countries.
6. The ecu was a unit of account composed of a weighted basket of EU curren-
cies, but ceased to exist in January 1999 when the euro came into being.
Greece. At the beginning of 1999, for the 11 initial par-
ticipants in EMU, full monetary union replaced the
ERM. Four EU countries have remained outside of
EMU, two of them as participants in ERM II (Denmark
and Greece). Britain and Sweden, however, have not
returned to a ﬁxed exchange rate approach.7
Money-growth targeting
 In the 1970s, many central banks adopted the
approach of targeting the growth rate of the money
supply for controlling inﬂation. In some cases, this
replaced earlier exchange rate targets. This approach,
though attractive because of the signiﬁcant control the
central bank could exert over the money aggregates,
was nevertheless dependent on the existence of a
robust relationship between money growth and inﬂa-
tion. In practice, this relationship proved to be unsta-
ble, partly because of the rapid pace of ﬁnancial
innovation (see Thiessen 1982 and Freedman 1983 for
a discussion of related difﬁculties in Canada). Conse-
quently, the importance of money-growth targeting
has diminished signiﬁcantly.
Still, the practice of announcing monetary targets per-
sisted into the 1990s in some countries (Table 1). For
example, the U.S. Federal Reserve is required by legis-
lation to announce annual targets for the rate of
domestic money growth. There is no requirement that
these targets be met, however, and they currently play
7.  Greece is poised to join EMU. Both Britain and Sweden have committed
themselves to a public referendum before proceeding with monetary union.
Table 1
Money-Growth and Inﬂation Targets for
Selected Countries
January 1990 January 2000
Money Inﬂation Money Inﬂation
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a limited role in policy decisions. The Bank of England
maintained a target range for the narrow money
aggregate through most of the decade, adding a target
range for broad money growth in 1992. Nevertheless,
the money supply objective performed only a second-
ary role in the 1990s and was dropped altogether in
1998.
Germany and Switzerland were more persistent prac-
titioners of money-growth targeting. Notably, both
countries enjoyed low rates of inﬂation in the 1990s,
but success did not come from rigid adherence to the
announced targets. The Bundesbank often missed its
annual growth targets, sometimes by a signiﬁcant
margin. Nevertheless, it emphasized the ongoing use-
fulness of targets as a guide for discussions on mone-
tary policy, both within the Bank and in the public
domain. In Switzerland, ﬁnancial instability led the
Swiss National Bank (SNB) to stop setting annual tar-
gets in 1990. They were replaced by medium-term,
ﬁve-year growth rates that served more as guides than
as targets. The SNB abandoned money targets at the
end of 1999.
As part of a “two-pillar” strategy, the ECB introduced
an annual “reference value” for the growth of broad
money in the euro area. The ECB has emphasized that
the reference value is not a rigid target, but that it
“will help to inform and present interest rate decisions
aimed at maintaining price stability over the medium
term.”8 While a money-growth target is attractive
because it emulates the approach of the highly
regarded German Bundesbank, the stability of the
relationship between money and inﬂation in the nas-
cent euro zone is uncertain. The second (and possibly
more important) pillar of the ECB’s strategy is a for-
ward-looking inﬂation assessment underpinned by an
explicit inﬂation objective that is discussed below.
Inﬂation targeting
 Almeida and Goodhart (1998) emphasize that the
widely held objective of price stability implies that
virtually all central banks have an inﬂation target,
although it may not be explicitly deﬁned. In the ﬁrst
half of the 1990s, however, a number of central banks
adopted explicit targets for inﬂation over a speciﬁed
time horizon.9 Clearly deﬁned inﬂation targets have
8. ECB (1999a, p. 49). This article contains a detailed description of the ECB’s
monetary policy strategy.
9.  The industrialized countries most commonly cited in this respect include
New Zealand (in 1990), Canada (1991), the United Kingdom (1992), Finland
and Sweden (both 1993), and Australia and Spain (both 1994). For an exten-
sive discussion of performance under inflation targets, see Bernanke et al. (1999).
the advantage of focusing policy efforts on the varia-
ble that is directly associated with price stability.
However, since monetary policy affects inﬂation only
with long and variable lags (of at least several quar-
ters), there is a delay before policy-makers are able to
evaluate the success of their policy actions. As a result,
this approach places heavy emphasis on inﬂation fore-
casts, so that policy-makers can act in a timely manner
before inﬂation pressures become unacceptably high.
Svensson (1999) argues that, if properly implemented,
an inﬂation-targeting approach is essentially an appli-
cation of inﬂation-forecast targeting.
Inﬂation targets, while a seemingly obvious approach
today, were quite revolutionary. Dissatisfaction with
both exchange rate and money-growth targets fuelled
the search for alternatives, but the analysis of inﬂation
targeting available in the early part of the decade was
relatively limited. Indeed, much of the extensive liter-
ature now available on inﬂation targets followed,
rather than preceded, their introduction. Inﬂation tar-
gets, however, proved to be well-suited to the needs of
the central banks involved. As a group, the countries
that adopted inﬂation targets had suffered from rela-
tively high rates of inﬂation (Chart 1). In addition, the
United Kingdom, Sweden, and Finland urgently
needed to introduce a replacement for the exchange
rate approach that had been abandoned in 1992.10
Inﬂation targets, while a seemingly
obvious approach today, were quite
revolutionary.
Explicit government participation has been a key ele-
ment of inﬂation targeting. It is viewed as essential for
reassuring economic agents that government authori-
ties are committed to the stated objective. In both Can-
ada and New Zealand, joint public statements by the
central banks and governments involved emphasized
the high level of co-operation and agreement. In Aus-
tralia, the Reserve Bank announced an inﬂation target
in 1994 that was later recognized by the government
in a joint statement in 1996. It was the government
that originally set the inﬂation target in the United
10. For an informative “behind-the-scenes” account of the process that led to
the adoption of inﬂation targets in New Zealand, where they ﬁrst appeared,
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Kingdom (of 1 to 4 per cent, with the goal of being
in the lower half of this range by the end of the then-
current parliament). This approach was superseded
by the 1998 Bank of England Act, which directed the
Bank to pursue price stability, initially deﬁned by the
government as a rate of inﬂation of 2 1/2 per cent. The
British government retains the right to revise the
deﬁnition of price stability.
The ECB has deﬁned its legislated mandate of pursu-
ing price stability as one of maintaining inﬂation
below 2 per cent. In selecting this deﬁnition, the ECB
argued that it “is in line with the deﬁnitions used by
most NCBS [National Central Banks] in the euro area
prior to the transition to Monetary Union” (ECB 1999a,
p. 46). In fact, one of the convergence criteria used by
countries to qualify for EMU led many euro-area econ-
omies to effectively target inﬂation. The inﬂation crite-
rion stipulated that prospective members must record
an inﬂation rate that was no more than 1.5 percentage
points higher than the average of the inﬂation rates in
the three countries with the lowest levels of inﬂa-
tion.11 At the beginning of 2000, the Swiss National
11. Over the 12-month reference period to January 1998, these three countries
proved to be Austria (1.1 per cent), France (1.2 per cent), and Ireland (1.2 per
cent), leading to a reference inﬂation rate of 2.7 per cent. All 15 EU member
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13 other countries**
7 countries with a target*
* Australia, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom
** Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, and the United
States
Bank also introduced an explicit inﬂation target of less
than 2 per cent.
Clearly deﬁned targets, whether they are inﬂation tar-
gets or something else, do not in themselves indicate
how central bankers arrive at their policy decisions. A
growing body of literature that had its start in the ﬁrst
half of the 1990s has addressed the issue of “rules”
that would lead to the attainment of quantiﬁable
objectives (see Box, p. 8). Such rules, however, are
viewed as too limited to be followed closely by the
monetary authorities.
Supporting Institutional Structures
Another component of a successful monetary frame-
work is an institutional structure designed to facilitate
the achievement of the policy objectives. Signiﬁcant
changes have occurred in this area as well.
Independence
To help ensure that central banks are free to carry out
their mandates, increased emphasis has been placed
on their independence from government authorities
(and indirectly from other vested interests). This
reduces the likelihood, for example, that political
expediency will inﬂuence monetary policy decisions
and lead to higher inﬂation.
To help ensure that central banks are
free to carry out their mandates,
increased emphasis has been placed
on their independence from
government authorities.
The emphasis on independence does not mean that
central banks have generally been left to determine
their objectives in isolation from governments (i.e.,
central banks have not been given “goal indepen-
dence”). As noted in the earlier discussion on inﬂation
targets, a number of countries have embedded the
goal of price stability in government legislation or
referred to it explicitly in joint government/central
bank statements. However, central banks have been
provided with greater operational independence
(often referred to as “instrument independence”), i.e.,
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achieve the stated objective. The issue of independ-
ence can also arise in other areas. For example, longer
tenures for policy-makers, or ﬁnancial independence
from the ﬁscal authority, may reduce susceptibility to
external inﬂuences.
Through a number of legislative steps, the authority to
make decisions on interest rates has been placed more
ﬁrmly with central banks. For example, the ECB’S
mandate requires that “neither the ECB nor any mem-
ber of its decision-making bodies shall seek or take
instructions from [European] Community institutions
or bodies” (ECB 1999b, p. 57). The national central
banks participating in EMU are also required to have a
similar degree of independence from government.
The Swedish Riksbank and the Bank of Japan have
both recently had their legislation revised to prevent
the government from dictating the conduct of mone-
tary policy. The revised legislation governing the Bank
of England also provides for operational independ-
ence through an “independent committee of experts,”
that will determine monetary policy actions. Previ-
ously, in both Britain and Japan, policy decisions had
been overseen by Treasury ofﬁcials.
Operational independence need not be explicitly leg-
islated in order to exist in practice. Nevertheless, even
in central banks where it has been present for some
time, such as the Bank of Canada, operational inde-
pendence was further entrenched in the 1990s through
the increased recognition of its importance and by the
strengthening consensus around price stability as the
appropriategoal.Theoperationalindependenceofthe
Australian central bank was facilitated by the 1996
statement by the Treasurer and the Governor of the
ReserveBank,whichrecognized“theindependenceof
Reaction Functions and Policy Rules
Interest in evaluating the determinants behind pol-
icy decisions received a considerable boost when
Taylor (1993) showed that the policy actions of the
U.S. monetary authorities over the 1987–92 period
could be closely replicated using a simple reaction
function based on a small number of variables. Tay-
lor’s equation, and the many similar versions sub-
sequently examined, are generally described as
“Taylor rules.” Gerlach and Schnabel (1999), for
example, showed that the aggregate (weighted)
interest rate for 1990–97 in the countries that even-
tually formed EMU could also be easily replicated
on the basis of a Taylor-type rule.
The success of Taylor rules in replicating past
behaviour suggests that it may be possible to deﬁne
reaction functions that the authorities could follow
in order to achieve their targets. In addition to pro-
viding a potential policy guide for the authorities
(to help maintain low inﬂation), such a reaction
function could also contribute to policy transpar-
ency if it were made public. There has since been
considerable research examining alternative quan-
titative “rules.” Some recent studies have focused
on rules based on inﬂation forecasts. With this
approach, the change in the policy instrument is a
function of the deviation of a conditional forecast of
inﬂation in some period from the target rate of
inﬂation.1
Despite the recent attention accorded to reaction
functions, it is unlikely that any central bank imple-
ments policy on the basis of an explicit reaction
function for their policy instruments. It is not clear
that such rules can incorporate all the information
relevant to the policy process, or that they are
robust across different models of how the world
works. At best, policy rules based on reaction func-
tions are being used as guides around which dis-
cretion is used.
1.  For recent developments with respect to various “feedback” rules,
including inflation-forecast-based rules, see Armour and Côté (1999–2000).9 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2000
the Bank and its responsibility for monetary policy
matters.”
Accountability
According greater independence to central banks has
raised the standards for accountability. Accountability
helps to ensure that the actions of the monetary
authorities remain focused on the appropriate objec-
tives. This can build public conﬁdence in the commit-
ment to price stability.
According greater independence to
centralbankshasraisedthestandards
for accountability.
Explicit targets can facilitate such accountability since
they provide a clear measure against which to assess
the performance of the monetary authorities. Never-
theless, unexpected developments may lead to devia-
tions from the targets. In some instances, there are
explicit procedures to deal with such situations. In
New Zealand, the Policy Targets Agreement requires
that the Reserve Bank explain why inﬂation has
moved outside the speciﬁed range and what measures
it will take to ensure that it moves back inside. Bank of
England legislation requires that the Governor write
an open letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer
explaining deviations of greater than 1 per cent in
either direction from the target and what actions will
be taken to bring inﬂation back in line. Subsequent let-
ters are required every three months while the devia-
tion persists.
Regular appearances by senior bank ofﬁcials before
legislative bodies have also become a key component
of accountability. While existing for many years in
some countries (e.g., the semi-annual Humphrey
Hawkins testimony by the Chair of the U.S. Federal
Reserve Board), it has now become much more preva-
lent elsewhere. Reporting to parliament is sometimes
stipulated in legislation, as in the revised Bank of Eng-
land Act and in the legislation governing the ECB. In
other cases, it has simply become a de facto standard
(e.g., in Canada, where the Governor appears before a
parliamentary committee following the release of the
semi-annual Monetary Policy Report).
At the same time that central banks have been
accorded greater authority to make policy decisions,
there has been a trend towards having these decisions
made by a committee. This approach can be formally
recognized in legislation, as was the case for the ECB
(with a 17-member Governing Council), the Bank of
England (9-member Monetary Policy Committee), the
Bank of Japan (9-member Policy Board) and the Riks-
bank (6-member Executive Board). It can also be
achieved informally, as it is in Canada, where the
authority for monetary policy decisions has been dele-
gated by the Governor to a 7-member internal Gov-
erning Council.12
Transparency
Accountability is also related to the overall transpar-
ency of the central bank and its communications activ-
ities. Central banks have been giving increased
emphasis to broader and more frequent explanations
of what they are doing and why. This has not simply
been for the purpose of accountability, but also
because the banks view openness as a way to avoid
misunderstandings or confusion regarding their pol-
icy actions, and as a way to gather support for policy
initiatives. Central banks have noticeably increased
the number of press conferences, press releases,
speeches, and other forms of public communication.
In addition, many central banks now maintain com-
prehensive Web sites to disseminate a wide variety of
information. In some cases, the banks maintain
regional ofﬁces that have an important, two-way com-
munications role.13
A comprehensive report, prepared by the monetary
authorities, on economic developments and the forces
affecting inﬂation has become a key communications
tool. Thus, a number of central banks have recently
introduced regular inﬂation reports (sometimes
required under legislation). Semi-annual or quarterly
reports are produced by the central banks of
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. Although similar publica-
tions are not produced by the ECB or the Bank of
12. See Courtis and Weller (1999–2000) for a survey of decision-making struc-
tures at 88 central banks. Berg and Lindberg (2000) examine the early func-
tioning of the Riksbank’s new Executive Board.
13.  The Bank of Canada reorganized its regional ofﬁces in 1996–97, largely
with this purpose in mind. For a broader discussion of changes affecting
accountability in Canada, see Freedman (2000) and Thiessen (2000). For a dis-
cussion of similar developments in the United States, see Ferguson (1999).10 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2000
Japan, both institutions place considerable emphasis
on the policy statements that appear in their (rela-
tively new) monthly bulletins.
Central banks have been giving
increased emphasis to broader and
more frequent explanations of what
they are doing and why.
Central banks have also worked to provide greater
operational transparency by improving the clarity of
their policy signals in ﬁnancial markets and providing
additional related information. This process reﬂects
the steady trend away from the secretive manner in
which central banks once implemented monetary pol-
icy. Given the international nature of ﬁnancial mar-
kets, central banks now ﬁnd themselves interacting
with a much larger and broader audience consisting of
participants in both domestic and foreign markets.
Reducing uncertainty can, in many situations, bring
beneﬁts in the form of lower risk premiums on interest
rates and smoother implementation of monetary
policy.
For example, in 1994 the U.S. Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) began to announce changes in the
federal funds rate and to provide a brief rationale for
the decision immediately after any meeting in which a
policy action occurred. In May 1999, it also began to
release more information on the likely future stance of
monetary policy (the policy bias).14 In June 1994, the
Bank of Canada introduced an explicit 50-basis-point
operating band, with its key policy rate (the Bank
Rate) tied to the top of that band (since February
1996). As is now the case with most central banks, a
press release accompanies any policy change. There is
evidence in both the United States and Canada that
the new procedures have reduced uncertainty in
ﬁnancial markets.15
14. This was soon felt to be open to misinterpretation by market participants,
and, in January 2000, the FOMC changed the wording of the “bias” to better
reﬂect “the risks to a satisfactory economic performance,” and in particular
“how the Committee assesses the risks of heightened inﬂation pressures or
economic weakness in the foreseeable future.”
15.  See Thornton (1996) and Muller and Zelmer (1999).
Although central banks have substantially increased
the extent of their openness over the course of the
1990s, at the end of the decade they were still strug-
gling with the question of the appropriate degree of
transparency. As argued by Winkler (1999, p. 19),
“clarity also comes at a premium and may, in some
circumstances, not be served by the indiscriminate
release of all conceivable pieces of information.” The
concern has been raised, for example, that publishing
full transcripts of policy meetings could inhibit a frank
exchange of views among decision-makers.16 The ECB
is an interesting case. Although it has come under crit-
icism for not being sufﬁciently transparent (see Favero
et al. 2000), the ECB provides an extensive amount of
information in the context of its new policy frame-
work, and considers itself to be an open institution.
Another issue confronting central banks regarding
transparency involves the publication of internal pro-
jections on which policy decisions are based (an essen-
tial component in a forward-looking framework).
While no central bank is legally required to release a
forecast, many publish a limited amount of informa-
tion on their near-term expectations for key variables,
generally economic growth and inﬂation. Some insti-
tutions, including the Bank of England, the Bank of
Norway, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, pub-
lish future paths for interest rates, although only in the
case of New Zealand does this represent the Bank’s
own expectations (based on various underlying
assumptions). One concern is that a projection con-
taining values for policy variables will be misinter-
preted as a commitment by the central bank, as
opposed to a provisional path where actual outcomes
could be quite different. Financial markets might also
react by quickly pushing market interest rates to the
higher or lower levels envisioned at a later date in the
projection.
Conclusion
The direction taken in the recent evolution of the mon-
etary policy framework used in the industrialized
economies has been heavily inﬂuenced by the per-
ceived role of credibility. A substantial body of litera-
ture has emerged arguing that if monetary policy is
highly credible (i.e., economic agents believe that
16.  Ferguson (1999) notes that many policy-makers at the U.S. FOMC have
begun to rely more heavily on prepared notes at policy meetings, owing to
the practice that began in the mid-1990s of releasing full transcripts of policy
meetings after ﬁve years.11 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2000
policy-makers are strongly committed to price stabil-
ity and have the means to achieve it), it will facilitate
the achievement of a low-inﬂation objective. The costs
associated with reducing inﬂation from unacceptable
levels, and maintaining it at low levels, will be less-
ened. In short, a credible central bank may be able to
achieve its policy goals more easily. Moreover, since
the ultimate goal of policy is to provide a healthy
economy, good overall economic performance is a
decisive factor in achieving policy credibility.17
Many of the changes to the policy
framework of central banks in the
1990s have, therefore, moved in the
direction of enhancing policy
credibility.
Many of the changes to the policy framework of cen-
tral banks in the 1990s have, therefore, moved in the
direction of enhancing policy credibility. The commit-
ment to price stability has been clariﬁed not only by
central bankers but by government authorities as well.
Central banks have been given greater operational
independence to pursue price stability, but at the same
time they have had to be more accountable to the pub-
lic. And transparency has been enhanced, not only to
facilitate accountability but also to explain and build
conﬁdence in the monetary authorities’ actions. In
ﬁnancial markets, central banks have increasingly
eliminated the aura of mystery that once surrounded
the implementation of policy and have taken meas-
ures to clarify their policy actions. In sum, central
banks have become much more open.
It is difﬁcult to isolate the contribution of the changes
introduced in the 1990s to inﬂation outcomes. Never-
theless, it is encouraging that inﬂation in the industri-
alized economies fell to low levels in the 1990s (Chart
2). There was a remarkable convergence in inﬂation
rates across countries, perhaps reﬂecting the stronger
consensus on policy objectives (Chart 3). Longer-term
17.  For a more detailed discussion, see Amano and Perrier (2000). For an
extensive survey of the attitudes of both central bankers (involving 84 central
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